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DeDominicis: No Duty at Any Speed?: Determining the Responsibility of the Auto

NO DUTY AT ANY SPEED?: DETERMINING THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURER IN SPEED-RELATED ACCIDENTS
As the automobile enters its second century of existence,1 it is
appropriate to examine an automobile industry paradox: while the
national speed limit has been established at 55 miles per hour, 2 manufacturers continue to design automobiles that achieve speeds
upwards of 100 miles per hour.3
In response to the devastating number of deaths and injuries
caused by automobile accidents, 4 courts and legislatures have expanded the responsibility of the manufacturer for the safety of the
automobile. Congress has required that manufacturers make automobiles crashworthy. 5 Courts have held automobile manufacturers
1. Browne, The First Car, MOTOR TREND, Nov. 1985, at 81.
2. 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) provides that the Secretary of Transportation shall not approve federal aid for any state highway project in any state with a maximum speed limit on
any highway in excess of 55 miles per hour. Each state is required to certify to the Secretary
before January first of each year that it is enforcing all speed limits in accordance with § 154.
23 U.S.C. § 141 (1982).
Each state must submit data to the Secretary in order to support its compliance with the
maximum speed limit. If the data shows that the percentage of motor vehicles exceeding 55
miles per hour is greater than 50%, the state's federal aid highway funds will be reduced by up
to 10% of the amount to be apportioned for the following fiscal year. 23 U.S.C. § 154(0

(1982).
3. For example, an analysis of the Mazda RX-7 included a discussion about the steering
capabilities of the RX-7 at 112 miles per hour. Yamaguchi, Mazda RX-7 Technical Analysis,
ROAD & TRACK, Nov. 1985, at 47, 47. The BMW 325i has a top speed of 135 miles per hour.
Frere, Letter From Europe, New 3-Series BMWs, ROAD & TRACK, Nov. 1985, at 119, 120.
The SAAB 900s claims a top speed of 105 miles per hour. Girdler, SAAB 900S 2-Door, ROAD
& TRACK, Nov. 1985, at 144, 145.
4. In 1982 alone, motor vehicles were involved in 28,500,000 accidents in the United
States, resulting in 4,490,000 injuries. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the
United States: 1985, at 599 (105th ed. 1984) (No. 1041 Motor Vehicle Accidents-Number
and Deaths: 1960 to 1983). The number of deaths within 30 days of an accident totaled
43,900, and 46,000 deaths occurred within one year of the accident. Id.
The total economic cost of motor vehicle accidents in the United States in 1982 was 60.2
billion dollars. Id.
5. See § 103 of the National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§
1381-98 (1982). Performance requirements have been established for the protection of vehicle
occupants in crashes. The standards are applicable to passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
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liable for manufacturing and design defects' which cause automobile

accidents (first collisions) .7 Manufacturers have also been held liable
for defects which do not actually cause accidents, but which increase
the injuries sustained by passengers in accidents resulting from other
vehicles, trucks, and buses. The stated purpose of the standards are
to reduce the number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity of injuries, by
specifying vehicle crashworthiness requirements in terms of forces and accelerations
measured on anthropomorphic dummies in test crashes, and by specifying equipment requirements for active and passive restraint systems.
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1985). See infra notes 50-51, 53.
6. RESTArEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
(i) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The product is considered to be defective if, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, it is "in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous
to him." Id., comment g.
A product may be defective because of a manufacturing flaw. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (defective soda bottle broke in waitress's hand). The allegedly defective product can be compared with properly manufactured
items in the same product line in order to determine if the product was, in fact, defective.
A product may also be defective because of its design. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler
Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding manufacturer liable for defective design of automobile door which failed to withstand a side impact), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). Unlike manufacturing defects, design defects cannot be determined by comparing a particular
product with other products in the same line. An alleged design defect presupposes that all
products within a line share the same defect. In such cases, comparison of products within the
same line would be meaningless.
Courts have focused on a risk-utility analysis as a means of determining whether or not a
product is defectively designed. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d
1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978). This author
takes the position that the speed capabilities of an automobile raise design questions which
should be analyzed by using a risk-utility approach once the court determines that the manufacturer owes a duty to the plaintiff. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
7. See, e.g., Pohlod v. General Motors Corp., 40 Mich. App. 583, 199 N.W.2d 277
(1972) (manufacturer liable for front ball joint which caused car to veer to the left and flip
over); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1979) (defect in steering
system which caused system to seize), a.f'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d
251 (1981); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (defective
transmission control mechanism).
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causes (second collisions)." The law of products liability has evolved
to the point where automobile manufacturers must foresee a certain
amount of misuse of their products: for example, drivers may have to
swerve in order to avoid danger.9 Furthermore, it is expected that
drivers will exceed the speed limit on occasion.1 0 Since manufacturers are required to anticipate that drivers will behave negligently,
they have a duty11 to design automobiles that will withstand colli8. These injuries are referred to as second collision injuries, because they are caused by
the impact of the passenger's body on the interior compartment of the vehicle. Automobile
manufacturers are now required to design cars that are "crashworthy," see supra note 5, so as
to minimize second collision injuries; they must provide a safe environment in which to have a
collision, since accidents are recognized as an everyday fact of life within the ambit of foreseeability to the manufacturer. For a general discussion of crashworthiness and second collisions,
see Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 521 (1974); Norman & Horgan, Crashworthiness:The EnhancedInjury Case, 20 TRIAL
84 (March 1984). But see Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness".An Untenable
Doctrine, 1971 INs. LJ. 583.
For cases involving second collision injuries, see Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104
(7th Cir. 1977), where a manufacturer was held liable for enhanced injuries resulting from
faulty design of the fuel system. Although it did not cause the original collision, the defect
caused the vehicle to burst into flames, killing the driver; Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), where an automobile manufacturer was held liable for a defectively
designed steering mechanism which was thrust into plaintiff's head after the impact of a headon collision. The court in Larsen stated:
While all risks cannot be eliminated nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed under
the present state of the art, there are many common-sense factors in design, which
are or should be well known to the manufacturer that will minimize or lessen the
injurious effects of a collision.
Id. at 503; Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959), where an automobile
manufacturer was held liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff when driver rapidly applied the
brakes. Plaintiff's head hit the dashboard and came in contact with the jagged edge of a defective ashtray.
9. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Volkswagon of Am., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1973), which held an automobile manufacturer liable for designing an automobile which overturned when plaintiff driver turned the wheel sharply at a speed of 42 miles per hour in order
to avoid an accident. The court reasoned that a driver may be required to turn the wheel
sharply for a variety of reasons and thus did not consider whether or not the driver had been
negligent in failing to check for traffic before moving into the right lane. The court stated that
"situations of peril do arise daily requiring heroic turning maneuvers," which the automobile
should be designed to withstand. Id. at 518, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
10. See, e.g., LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980),
stating that while speeding is illegal, "[lt would be blinking [at] reality . . . to hold that Ford
could not reasonably have expected purchasers of any automobile, ..
to transgress our nation's speeding laws periodically." Id. at 989, n.4 (emphasis added).
11. The duty concept is not easily defined. Before a determination can be made that a
party was negligent towards an injured party, it must first be determined that the party owed a
duty to the injured party. Various policy concerns will influence the decision that a duty was
owed. Professor Green states:
The determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes the particular risk
imposed on the victim ultimately rests on broad policies which underlie the law.
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sions and prevent or minimize second collision impact.
While automobile manufacturers are required to foresee the
negligence of drivers, thus far they have not been held accountable
for injuries caused by the speed capabilities of their products. AutoThese policies may be characterized generally as morality, the economic good of the
group, practical administration of the law, justice as between the parties, and other
considerations relative to the environment out of which the case arose.
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L. REv. 42, 45 (1962).
The policy issues implicated in a determination of duty are readily apparent in the area of
social host liability. In Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984), the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that a social host who provides intoxicating liquor to a guest, knowing that the guest is intoxicated and will soon drive, is jointly and severally liable (together
with the intoxicated guest) to a party injured as a result of the guest's drunk driving. The
court first determined that the host had not behaved reasonably: he provided his guest with
liquor knowing that the guest was intoxicated and would have to drive in order to get home.
The court then examined the question of whether or not it was realistic to impose a duty on a
social host to victims of his guest's drunken driving. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
The court recognized that the imposition of a duty required a balancing of public policy
and fairness issues. It found that judicial imposition of this duty was consistent with a legislative goal of reducing drunk driving. The financial burden the duty would place on the host (a
burden which the host would not be able to pass on to guests as would a facility licensed to
serve alcohol to its customers) was outweighed by the interest in compensating the innocent
victims of drunk driving. The court's concern about the chilling effect the imposition of this
duty would have on private socializing, as well as the concern that the host should not be
responsible for the intervening recklessness of the drunk driver, was similarly outweighed by its
conclusion that "society . . . must change its habits and do whatever is required . . . in order
to stop the senseless loss inflicted by drunken drivers." Id. at 558-59, 476 A.2d at 1229. Contra
Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aft'd, 55 A.D.2d 597,
389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976) (refusing to impose a duty on social hosts because of the difficult
policies implicated and a belief that the legislature did not intend to enact a law making the
provision of alcohol at social events actionable). See also Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (holding a therapist
liable to the foreseeable victim of a patient the therapist knows is violent, despite the chilling
effect such a duty will have on the confidentiality of the patient-therapist relationship); Kelley
v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985) (holding a manufacturer of small,
easily concealed "Saturday Night Special" handguns liable to innocent persons who suffer
gunshot injuries from the criminal use of their products, because the manufacturer (or seller)
knows or ought to know that he is making (or selling) a product principally to be used in
criminal activity).
Once it is determined that one party owes a duty of reasonable care towards an injured
party, what is reasonable in a particular case is determined by a risk-utility analysis. Green,
supra this note, at 45. Risk-utility analysis was expressed by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), as a function of three variables: 1)
the probability of harm occurring, 2) the gravity of the injury that would result if the harm
did occur, and 3) the burden of adequate precautions to guard against the harm occurring. Id.
at 173. If the product of the first two factors exceeds the burden of adequate precautions, the
failure to take those precautions constitutes negligence. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). For an alternative expression of the reasonableness standard, see
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REv. 40, 42-43 (1915) (negligence depends on an evaluation
of five factors).
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mobile manufacturers, perhaps recognizing their apparent insulation
from liability, have continued to market their products aggressively
12
with an emphasis on speed and power.
This Note discusses the limited case law addressing the question
of manufacturer liability for injuries caused by excesstive speeding,
and criticizes the use of single-factor duty tests 3 which have prevented plaintiffs from litigating their claims. The author recommends that courts use a multi-factor test 14 in determining whether a
manufacturer owes a duty to those injured in accidents involving excessive speeds.
I.

SCHEMEL V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.

5

The only case to consider a cause of action against an automobile manufacturer for designing an automobile capable of attaining
excessive speeds exculpated the manufacturer from liability. The
case, however, was predicated on faulty reasoning no longer applicable in modern products liability law.
12. For example, a current television advertisement contains the following language:
At 110 miles per hour engineers find the new HONDA ACCORD LXI Hatchback to
be quiet and comfortable. And at that speed you could find it to be twice as quiet
and comfortable.
A VOLVO advertisement in a recent issue of Motor Trend reads:
Yes. It will fly. If you don't believe it, strap yourself into the cockpit of a VOLVO
740 Turbo and take off.
This flying machine will rocket you from a standing start to legal speed in 6.7
seconds. . . So check into your VOLVO dealers and log some time in the intercooled
740 Turbo.
No pilot's license required.
MOTOR TREND,

Nov. 1985, at 121.

Similar advertisements were criticized in 1963 by Professor O'Connell, who argued that
advertising and sales techniques play a large role in creating public tastes. O'Connell, Taming
the Auto, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 299, 358-59 (1963). Consumers desire powerful cars as an outlet
for aggression. Automobile manufacturers cultivate this desire by portraying their cars as symbols of speed and strength. Id. at 362. Even the names given to cars suggest speed, power, and
daring (e.g., Electra, Firebird, Thunderbird, Cougar, Cobra, Jaguar). Id. at 361. One conclusion to be drawn from Professor O'Connell's analysis is that consumers will expect the automobile to be safe at the speeds it is depicted as capable of achieving, and that consumers will be
encouraged to drive at excessively high speeds. For an analysis of the role of consumer expectations in determining whether a product is defective, see infra note 24.
13. The two single-factor duty tests referred to in this Note are the patent danger rule
and the intended purpose doctrine. See infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
15. 261 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 945 (1968).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

A.

[Vol. 14:403

Trial Court

In Schemel, the plaintiff brought an action against General Motors (GM) to recover for personal injuries sustained when his car
was struck from the rear by a GM Chevrolet Impala. The Impala
was being driven at a speed of approximately 115 miles per hour
when it struck plaintiff's car.'"
Plaintiff claimed that GM had a duty to the public to refrain
from (1) manufacturing and selling cars capable of attaining speeds
in excess of 100 miles per hour, and (2) advertising its products in
such a way as to encourage irresponsible and reckless drivers to drive
17
at excessive speeds.

GM moved to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.' 8 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted GM's motion and dismissed plaintiff's action, relying heavily on Evans v. General Motors Corp.,' 9 a case decided by the same court and affirmed

by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The
Evans case stood for the proposition that a plaintiff could only rewhile the product was being used for its
cover for injuries 2sustained
0
purpose.
intended
16. Id. at 135.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
20. Id. at 824-25. In Evans, the driver of a car designed by defendant GM was killed in
a collision. While plaintiff did not claim that the design of the car caused the accident, she
alleged that an alternative design would have provided additionalprotection to the driver in
the event of a collision. The court acknowledged that the injury occurred in a manner foreseeable to the manufacturer, yet dismissed plaintiff's action, holding that the manufacturer had
no duty to make the automobile safer as long as it was already safe for its intended purpose.
Id.
The Evans court relied on the patent danger rule for the proposition that the automobile
manufacturer had no duty to render the vehicle more safe, since the danger of unintended uses
was obvious. The patent danger rule has since been rejected. See infra notes 60-80 and accompanying text. The court also stated that any decision to require automobile manufacturers to
construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide would have to be a legislative decision. 359 F.2d at 824.
The court's reasoning is flawed in several respects. While the court placed primary emphasis on the patent danger rule, it did not articulate those dangers which it found to be
obvious to the decedent, or to any reasonable driver. Whether the average driver is even aware
of the type of frame his car is built upon is open to question. It is highly doubtful that the
dangers of a X-shaped frame, not even visible to the consumer, can be considered open and
obvious when compared with products considered in other cases relying on the patent danger
rule. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957) (manufacturer of an elastic exercise rope not liable to plaintiff
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Based upon the Evans holding, the Schemel court concluded
that defendant had no duty to restrict the speed of its vehicles.

While speeding was foreseeable to the manufacturer, speeding was
illegal per se in the absence of a justifiable excuse.2 The court refused to impose a duty upon defendant to make it impossible for its
products to be used in an unlawful manner.22 The court went on to
state that any changes in automobile design safety would have to be

embodied in a uniform national standard established by the legislature, and not hammered out on a case-by-case basis by the judiciary. 23 Furthermore, since GM's advertisements were truthful, the
who sustained severe eye injuries, since it was obvious that if the rope was stretched and then
quickly released it would snap back); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252
A.2d 855 (1969) (manufacturer of a rotary blade power lawnmower not liable for injuries
sustained when plaintiff fell and his foot slipped under the mower while it was running; it was
obvious that if a person using the mower fell, there was no safety guard to prevent a leg or
arm from slipping under the machine); Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d
409 (1951) (manufacturer of a steam vaporizer not liable for severe burns sustained by a child
since it was obvious that if the vaporizer was tilted or upset while operating, someone could be
scalded).
The intended purpose doctrine is similarly flawed. The Evans court concluded that the
manufacturer could foresee collisions, yet required only that the product be made reasonably
safe for intended purposes. The court distinguished Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729
(8th Cir. 1959), which held an automobile manufacturer liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff when the driver rapidly applied the brakes. Plaintiff hit his head on the dashboard and
injured his eye on the jagged edge of a defectively manufactured ashtray. The Zahn court held
that the manufacturer had a duty to foresee such events as collisions, or sudden application of
the brakes, which would pitch a passenger forward. The manufacturer was responsible for
eliminating a jagged edged ashtray which would increase the severity of injury to a passenger
in such an event. The Evans court found that the manufacturer in Zahn was liable because the
ashtray was unfit for its intended purpose. Evans, 359 F.2d at 825. The fitness of the ashtray
to hold ashes, however, was not at issue in Zahn. The Evans court clearly overlooked the fact
that Zahn held automobile manufacturers to a duty of foreseeing collisions, and constructing
their products so as to minimize injuries to a passenger in the event of such a collision.
21. 261 F. Supp. at 135. The states do not uniformly hold that speeding is negligence
per se. For state decisions that are consistent with Schemel, see Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199
(5th Cir. 1970); Velardi v. Selwitz, 165 Conn. 635, 345 A.2d 527 (1974); Dupree v. Batts, 276
N.C. 68, 170 S.E.2d 918 (1969); Rowe v. Frick, 250 S.C. 499, 159 S.E.2d 47 (1968); Amrine
v. Murray, 28 Wash. App. 650, 626 P.2d 24 (1981). For cases holding that speeding is not
negligence per se, see Booth v. Home Indem. Co., 244 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1957); Adkins v.
Dirickson, 523 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Ruiz v. Faulkner, 12 Ariz. App. 352, 470 P.2d
500 (1970); Hartwig v. Olson, 261 Iowa 1265, 158 N.W.2d 81 (1968); Howland v. West, 507
S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1974); Holliday v. Patchen, 164 Neb. 53, 81 N.W.2d 593 (1957); Simon v.
Woodland, 179 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1970); Anderson v. Schulz, 527 P.2d 151 (Wyo. 1974).
22. 261 F. Supp. at 136.
23. Id. The court referred to the lengthy public hearings held in the United States Senate in March and April of 1966 which examined the question of automobile safety. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, P.L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718, was
enacted as a result of the hearings, and the Schemel court noted that the Act did not impose a
maximum automobile speed capacity with respect to automobile designs. The court believed
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court refused to consider the possibility of any adverse effect of defendant's advertising on the driving habits of its consumers. 24
that Congress would have enacted a national speed standard for the highly centralized automobile industry should Congress have deemed it necessary. 261 F. Supp. at 136.
24. The court reasoned that a manufacturer had the right to advertise its products truthfully, and that any adverse effect of truthful advertisements on the consumer were far too
speculative to support a legal cause of action. Id.
This reasoning is inconsistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Comment i to § 402A states that "[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id., comment i (emphasis
added). See supra note 6.
In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972), the California Supreme Court discussed the impact of California's adoption of § 402A.
It concluded that a product was defective if a plaintiff proved that the product contained a
defect which proximately caused his injuries. The court found that the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification was added to § 402A simply to protect manufacturers of inherently dangerous products, such as drugs, alcohol, and automobiles, from responsibility for all the harm that
such products cause. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
Six years later in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978), the California Supreme Court re-examined Cronin and other decisions which had
grappled with the definition of defect. The court deviated from Cronin and read § 402A as
defining defect, in part, by the consumer's expectations of the product. Barker announced a
two prong test of defect. A product is defective in design either:
(1) If the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or
(2) If. . .the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such design.
Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (emphasis added). The second prong of the
Barker test is a traditional statement of risk-utility balancing. See supra note 11. The first
prong is a formulation of the consumer expectation test.
The consumer expectation test attained status as an independent test of defective design
in Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981). In
Lelchtamer, the plaintiffs were severely injured in an offroad jeep accident when the jeep
"pitched over" (the motion which would result if a skewer was run from side to side through
the center of a plastic model of the jeep and then rotated so that both the front and rear
bumpers moved in circles about each other). Id. at 459, 424 N.E.2d at 572. The jeep had been
designed with a roll bar provided solely as protection against a side roll and not as protection
against a pitch-over.
Plaintiffs claimed that the advertised use of the vehicle involved a great risk of forward
pitch-overs. Id. at 459, 424 N.E.2d at 572. They faulted defendant's advertising campaign,
which stressed the jeep's ability to conquer steep hills, and challenged potential jeep owners to
"discover the rough, exciting world of mountains, forest, [and] rugged terrain." Id. at 459, 424
N.E.2d at 572. Plaintiffs testified that they had seen these ads and believed that the roll bar
would protect them in the event.that the vehicle landed upside down. Id. at 460, 424 N.E.2d at
573. They did not claim that the lack of protection in the event of a pitch-over caused the
accident, but that it enhanced the injuries they sustained.
The court held that "[a] product will be found unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous
to an extent beyond the expectations of an ordinary consumer when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner." Id. at 467, 424 N.E.2d at 577.
For a complete discussion of the development of products liability law in California and a
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B.

Appellate Court

1. Majority.-Plaintiff in Schemel appealed the decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 25 On
appeal, plaintiff relied on section 398 of the Restatement of Torts,
Second,26 claiming that any automobile capable of being driven at
speeds in excess of 110 miles per hour was dangerous for the uses for
which it was manufactured.
The court rejected plaintiff's theory and concluded that defendant's product was not being used in a lawful manner when it hit
plaintiff's car. Since defendant's automobile was not dangerous when
used in a lawful manner, (i.e. when driven at legal speeds), defendant could not be held liable for plaintiff's injuries.17
detailed examination of Cronin and Barker, see Schwartz, Foreward: UnderstandingProducts
Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435 (1979). For a discussion of Leichtamer and an approval of the
use of the consumer expectation test as an independent test of defect, see Twerski, From RiskUtility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of JudicialScreening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861 (1983). See also Owen, Rethinking the Policies of
Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681, 690 (1980) (crediting the Barker test for
according formal respect for the consumers' fairly developed expectations of product safety,
yet cautioning against a use of the consumer expectation test which would unfairly favor consumers). But see Keeton, Products Liability-DesignHazardsand the Meaning of Defect, 10
CuM. L. REv. 293, 300-05 (1979) (criticizing the consumer expectation test which operates
independently of risk-utility balancing).
25. 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
26. Id. at 804. Section 398 provides:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous
for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he
should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical
harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan
or design.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965).
27. 384 F.2d at 804-05. The court cited § 395 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
as support for this analysis:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable
risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those whom he should expect to be
endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is supplied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965) (emphasis supplied by court). The court's
reliance on § 395 as support for its statement that the automobile was safe "for the purpose
for which it was supplied," 384 F.2d at 805, confuses § 395 with the Evans intended purpose
doctrine, supra note 20. Section 395 does not state that the manufacturer will only be held
liable when the product causes injury to someone using the product as the manufacturer intended. Comment k to § 395, entitled Foreseeable uses and risks, states that the manufacturer
may reasonably anticipate other uses than what the manufacturer primarily intended. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 395 Comment k (1965). A chair manufacturer, for example, may expect that the chair will be used as a step ladder.
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The court also based its rejection of plaintiff's action on the patent danger rule announced in Campo v. Scofield.2 The Schemel
court reasoned that a manufacturer is not an insurer of its product
and is therefore "not bound to anticipate and guard against grossly
careless misuse of its product by reckless drivers."29 While the manufacturer has a duty to avoid risks created by dangers that are latent
or concealed, the manufacturer owes no duty to avoid any risk created by patent, or open and obvious dangers. Since the dangers of
speeding are obvious, 30 the court refused to hold defendant liable.
Implicit in the court's holding was the determination that the driver
of the car which hit plaintiff's car was the only party from whom
plaintiff could recover, since the driver had operated the car at unlawful speeds.31
The court reiterated the district court's statement that Congress, rather than the court, should dictate any changes in automobile design standards. It concluded its opinion by stating that GM
had no duty to conceal the reserve power of its automobile in adverpossible misuse of the power by a "wantisements in order to avoid
'3 2
tonly negligent driver."
2. Dissent.-Judge Kiley, disagreeing with the majority,
would have allowed plaintiff to proceed with his cause of action
against GM. He attacked the majority's reasoning on several
grounds.
a. Reliance on Evans.--Judge Kiley criticized the majority's
reliance on the statement made in Evans3 that the nature and exThe court's reliance on § 395 indicates that it did not consider the ability of a manufacturer of high speed automobiles, who truthfully advertises the high speed capabilities of his
automobiles, to anticipate that the cars would be driven at high speeds and might cause
injuries.
28. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). The patent danger rule dictates that the manufacturer not be held liable for any injuries caused by a design-related hazard that is, or
should be, obvious to a reasonable product user. The manufacturer can therefore be held liable
only for injuries caused by hidden or latent dangers in the product's design. Id. at 475, 95
N.E.2d at 806. For a complete discussion of the patent danger rule, the criticisms and eventual
rejection of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes 60-80.
29. 384 F.2d at 805 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Prior to the appeal, plaintiff had already collected damages from the insurer of
Michael N. Bigham (the driver of the car manufactured by defendant) in exchange for a
convenant not to sue. Id. at 803.
32. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
33. 359 F.2d 822.
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tent of defendant's duty presented a question of law for the court. 34
He maintained that GM had the same duty as any member of society, that of acting with reasonable care. 35 Reasonable care on the
part of an automobile manufacturer must reflect the widespread
knowledge of the ever-increasing number and severity of automobile
accidents.36 Therefore, Judge Kiley reasoned, GM should be charged
with the duty of reasonably foreseeing that a high speed automobile
would be driven at the speeds it was advertised as capable of
37
attaining.
The dissent further objected to the majority's extension of the
Evans' intended purpose doctrine38 to the facts of Schemel.3 9 The
facts in the two cases were distinguishable, according to Judge Kiley,
because the unlawful use of the automobile's speed capacity in
Schemel was not unintended within the meaning of Evans. If the
intended purpose of the product was defined in Evans by the subjective intent of the manufacturer, GM's allegedly "unduly enticing advertising" 40 was evidence of GM's subjective intent to encourage
drivers to utilize the high speed capabilities of GM's cars. In addition, the dissent cited the statement in GM's brief that the speed
capacity was deliberately planned to provide reserve power for passing and to reduce engine strain 41 as further evidence of GM's subjective intent to have its cars driven at unlawful speeds. Judge Kiley
questioned the logic of concluding that high speed driving was unintended by GM, when GM had promoted the lawless speed capacity
2
of its cars.4
Alternatively, if the intended purpose doctrine was defined by
an objective standard (i.e. the "normal" use of the product),' 3 Judge
Kiley maintained that unlawful use may not be unintended or abnormal use. He again cited GM's brief for its reference to the "common
34. 384 F.2d at 806 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
35. Id. See Green, supra note 11, at 45.
36. 384 F.2d at 806. Judge Kiley noted that automobiles are used in an environment in
which a traffic death occurs every 11 minutes and an injury every 19 seconds (citing 16 DE
PAUL L. REV. 261, 264 (1966)), and in which there are reckless and irresponsible drivers. He

reasoned that this environment must be considered in any meaningful application of the "reasonableness" standard. Id.

37. Id.
38.

See supra note 20.

39.

384 F.2d at 807.

40.
41.

Id. at 808 (Kiley, J.,dissenting).
Id.

42.
43.

Id. at 810.
Id. at 808.
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knowledge" that an automobile can be driven too fast. 44 This com-

mon knowledge, coupled with impressive statistics regarding the
number of injuries and deaths resulting from excessive speeds, 45 led

Judge Kiley to conclude that the manufacturer must anticipate the
abuse of the speed capacity of its automobiles. The manufacturer
must not use as a shield from liability the clearly erroneous46 notion
that drivers will not drive faster than the legal speed limit.

b. The Patent Danger Rule.-The dissent observed that the
majority incorrectly relied on the patent danger rule. While not criticizing the rule itself, the dissent found it inapposite because the risk
of another driver traveling at unlawful speeds could not be classified
as open and obvious.47 Judge Kiley would have defined the problem
as one of assumption of risk:48 since even extraordinary care on
plaintiff's part could not have avoided his being hit by the car manufactured by defendant, the only question was whether plaintiff's conduct (riding as a passenger) was inherently unreasonable given the
risks created by drivers traveling at excessive speeds. Like the question of the reasonableness of GM's conduct, the assumption of risk
question should also be decided by the jury.' 9

c. Deferral to the Legislature.-Judge Kiley disagreed with
the majority's belief that any changes in automobile safety standards
should be made by Congress. He reasoned that Congress' purpose in
enacting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
196650 was not to create causes of action or to compensate victims,
44. Id.
45. Id. Judge Kiley listed the following statistics:
10% of all fatal accidents involve a car traveling over 70 miles per hour.
13% of all fatal accidents in rural areas involve a car traveling over 70 miles per
hour.
33.3% of all fatal accidents involve excess speed.
20.6% of all injury causing accidents involve excess speed.
Id., n.11 (citing National Safety Council, Accident Facts 46, 48, 53 (1966 ed.)). "Excess
Speed" was the leading factor in urban and rural fatal accidents, and in rural injury-causing
accidents at the time. Id.
46. 384 F.2d at 808 (Kiley, J., dissenting); MacDonald, The 55 M.P.H. Speed Limit No
Longer Makes Sense, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1986, at 27, col. 5 (a study commissioned by Congress revealed that more than half the drivers in two-thirds of the states drive at speeds in
excess of the 55 mile per hour limit).
47. 384 F.2d at 809 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
48. Id. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965) states: "A plaintiff who
voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm." For a discussion of the defense of assumption of risk in
the product liability area, see Keeton, Assumption Of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965).
49. 384 F.2d at 809 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-98 (1982).
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but to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to establish motor
vehicle safety standards. 1
The dissent stated that courts would still be called upon to decide liability for violations of the established standards, as well as to
supplement the Act's purpose of reducing accidents and the injuries

and deaths which resulted.5 2 Since violations of the Act's standards
resulted only in small monetary penalties,53 Judge Kiley maintained
that the possibility of suits resulting in large awards to injured plain-

tiffs would more effectively encourage automobile manufacturers to
upgrade the safety of their products."
II. ANALYSIS OF SCHEMEL
The Schemel decision dictated that automobile manufacturers

had no duty, as a matter of law,55 to foresee that an individual would
drive an automobile at the speeds it was capable of attaining, or to
prevent the injuries sure to result from high speed driving. The court
did not assign to the jury the difficult task of determining the reasonableness of GM's conduct in designing a car capable of excessive and
unlawful speeds. It did not examine the factors which would be con51. Id. § 1381 declares the Congressional purpose as follows:
Congress hereby declares that the purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents. Therefore,
Congress determines that it is necessary to establish motor vehicle safety standards
for motor vehicles and equipment in interstate commerce; to undertake and support
necessary safety research and development; and to expand the national driver
register.
15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982).
The authorization of the Secretary of Transportation is set out in § 1392(a):
The Secretary shall establish by order appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety
standards. Each such Federal motor vehicle safety standard shall be practicable,
shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.
15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1982).
52. 384 F.2d at 810 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1398(a) (1982) established a penalty not to exceed $1,000 for each
violation of the Act. The maximum civil penalty for any related series of violations is established at $800,000. Id. When Schemel was decided, however, the maximum penalty allowed
was $400,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1398(a) (1966), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-492, 88 Stat. 1478
(1974).
Section 1398(b) authorizes the Secretary to compromise monetary penalties, taking into
consideration the appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the business of the person
charged, and the gravity of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1398(b) (1982).
54. 384 F.2d at 810 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
55. The District Court for the Southern District of Indiana sustained defendant's motion
to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See
supra text accompanying notes 18-19. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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sidered in a risk-utility analysis of a defendant's conduct. Instead the
court mechanically applied two single-factor, or "no-duty," 5 6 tests in
order to determine whether GM owed a duty to the plaintiff.
The first no-duty rule relied upon in Schemel was the intended
purpose doctrine. 57 Its use in Schemel illustrated the court's reluctance to extend the duty of the automobile manufacturer beyond
traditional and judicially manageable limits. The court read plaintiff's allegations as suggesting the imposition of a duty on the manufacturer to design "an automobile incapable of causing injury...
through foreseeable misuse for a purpose for which the automobile
was never supplied." 58 While the court conceded that gross speeding
was foreseeable to the manufacturer,59 speeding was not an intended
use of the automobile. Therefore, the manufacturer was not responsible for any resulting injuries.
The second no-duty rule used by the Schemel court was the patent danger rule.60 As illustrated in Campo v. Scofield,61 the patent
danger rule states that a manufacturer is not liable for any designrelated hazard that is or should be obvious to a reasonable product
user.6 2 Therefore, the manufacturer can only be held liable for hidden or latent dangers in the product's design.63
The Schernel court found that the dangers of excessive and unlawful speed were so obvious to the driver of an automobile that the
automobile manufacturer should not be responsible for any injuries
or deaths caused by such gross speeding.64 Despite its conclusion
56. Single-factor, or "no-duty," analysis is a method of avoiding the difficult task of
determining, through risk-utility analysis, whether or not a manufacturer owed a duty to the
particular plaintiff. No-duty rules permit the court, and not the jury, to establish standards for
conduct by holding that a defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff as a matter of law. See J.
HBNDERSON & A. TWERSKI,PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS & PROCESS 519-20 (1985) (temporary edition).

One commentator stated that a court's conclusion that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff
may result because of institutional limitations preventing courts from fairly litigating design
defect cases. The no-duty conclusion may also result from the recognition that alternative decisionmaking bodies may exist for determining the appropriate level of product safety. Twerski,
Seizing The Middle Ground Between Rules & Standards in Design Defect Litigatiorn Advancing Directed Verdict Practice In The Law Of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv.521, 551 (1982).

57.
58.
59.
60.

See supra text accompanying note 20.
384 F.2d at 805.
Id.
See supra note 28.

61.

301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).

62. Id. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804.
63. Id.
64. 384 F.2d at 805.
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that speeding was foreseeable to the manufacturer, the Schemel
court strictly adhered to the patent danger no-duty rule.6
Both the intended purpose doctrine and the patent danger noduty rules set forth in Schemel received a great deal of criticism.
The dissatisfaction with the intended purpose doctrine led one court
to re-examine the duty of an automobile manufacturer toward drivers. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,6 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit granted relief to a plaintiff who was injured in a
second collision impact. The plaintiff came in contact with the defectively designed steering assembly.67 The court examined the accepted
principle that a manufacturer's duty of design and construction extends to producing a product reasonably fit for its intended use. It
concluded, however, that the realities of automobile travel dictated
an expansion of the interpretation of intended use: automobiles are
intended for use on the roads and highways, and that use carries
with it the probability and potential of injury-producing impacts. 68
The court concluded that the manufacturer must consider the environment in which a product is used. 69 Therefore, the court imposed a
duty on the automobile manufacturer to use reasonable care in designing the vehicle so that users would not be subjected to an unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury in the event of a collision.70
The widespread acceptance of Larsen7 accelerated a growing
trend toward expanding the manufacturer's responsibility for the design of its products. Larsen was eventually adopted by the Seventh
Circuit in Huff v. White Motor Corp.,72 where the court of appeals
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 502. The court cited Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.

1962) (manufacturers of furniture polish have a duty to anticipate that bottle might be left
within reach of children). See also Filler v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1970) (man-

ufacturer of sunglasses has a duty to foresee that glasses would be worn by persons playing
baseball, especially since glasses had been advertised as being worn by baseball players).
70. 391 F.2d at 503.

71.

As of 1977, 29 jurisdictions plus the District of Columbia had adopted Larsen and

had rejected the narrow intended purpose rule of Evans, 359 F.2d at 822. The Evans decision

was severely criticized. See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the JudicialProcess, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 645, 656 (1967); Case Notes, 16 DE PAUL L. REV. 261 (1966); Notes, 4 Hous.
L. REV. 311 (1966); Recent Decisions, 55 ILL. B.J. 238 (1966); Recent Decisions, 42 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 111 (1966); Cases Noted, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 698. In fact, Evans was not fol-

lowed in any jurisdiction after 1969. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 108 (7th Cir.
1977) (adopting Larsen and overruling Evans).
72.

565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
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expressly rejected the narrow intended purpose doctrine it had announced eleven years earlier in Schemel. To the extent that it relied
on the intended purpose doctrine, Schemel was overruled in Huff7
The patent danger rule has also received extensive criticism.7 4
In Micallef v. Miehle Co.," the New York Court of Appeals overruled Campo and rejected the patent danger rule because of the inequity of absolving a manufacturer of liability simply because the
dangers of his product were obvious.78 The court instead held that a
manufacturer has a duty to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm, not
only to the product user, but also to anyone likely to be exposed to
the harm resulting from the77 product's intended, or unintended but
reasonably foreseeable, use.
While that portion of the Schemel decision which is based on
the patent danger rule has never been expressly overruled, widespread rejection of the patent danger rule78 has significantly diminished the value of the Schemel decision in determining what duty, if
any, the automobile manufacturer owes to victims of accidents in73. Id. at 106, n.l.
74. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970)
(obviousness of the danger should be viewed as an element of a manufacturer's defense, and
nof as a determination that the manufacturer owed no duty to the injured party); 2 F. HARPER
& F. JANEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 28.5, at 1543 (1956) (obviousness of the harm is only one
of a number of factors which should be considered in a risk-utility analysis); Marschall, An
Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous
Products,48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (1973) (patent danger rule does not ensure fairness between the parties, therefore manufacturers of patently dangerous products should be absolutely
liable to injured consumers); Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-RestructuringAssumption
of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IowA L. REV. 1 (1974) (elimination of patent danger rule would not create unlimited liability for manufacturers).
75. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
76. Id. at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
77. Id.
78. For cases holding manufacturers liable despite the obviousness of the danger of the
particular product, see, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1972) (lawnmower which cut grass with a single revolving blade and ejected it through
an open, unprotected hole in the front; plaintiff fell and his hand slid into the hole); Union
Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978) (sugar beet refining machine without
safety guard; machine cleaned by reaching under conveyor belt to remove pulp while machine
in operation); Derrick v. Yoder Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 864, 410 N.E.2d 1030 (1980) (steel cutting machine not fitted with a safety guard; plaintiff pulled onto conveyor belt into the moving
parts of the machine); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713
(1970) (hay baler attached to a tractor by a drawbar; to adjust drawbar for use, plaintiff had
to reach behind a metal plate and into the path of a moving part). There are, however, a small
minority of jurisdictions which continue to adhere to the patent danger rule. See, e.g., Greenway v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 163 Ga. App. 698, 294 S.E.2d 541 (1982); Bemis Co. v. Rubush,
427 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Bryant-Poff, Inc. v. Hahn,
454 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied,-465 U.S. 1075 (1984).
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volving gross speeding.
Under present design defect law, the use of the patent danger
rule 9 and the intended purpose doctrine 0 as single factor duty tests
has diminished, while the use of risk-utility analysis in establishing
product defects has increased.' Risk-utility analysis, which is usually a jury function,8 2 determines the negligence of a manufacturer
by weighing the probability of harm resulting from the use of the
product, and the gravity of harm, against the burden of adequate
precautions to avoid the harm. If the probability of harm, when multiplied by the gravity of harm, exceeds the burden to the manufacturer and to society of providing adequate precautions against the
harm, the product is deemed defective.8 3
While the patent danger rule and the intended purpose doctrine
have been rejected as single factor tests, elements of both have been
incorporated into modern products liability law. The patency of the
danger of a product is relevant in determining the probability of
harm occurring.84 The more obvious the danger, the less probable
the occurrence of harm. Likewise, the use for which a product is
intended is considered in a proximate cause analysis.8 5
The increased use of risk-utility analysis has aided plaintiffs
who seek to establish that a defendant's behavior or product failed to
meet societal standards. Design defect claims have survived defendants' motions for dismissal and have reached the jury for
consideration.86
79.
80.

See supra note 28.
See supra text accompanying notes 57-70.

81.

J. HENDERSON & A.

82.

Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 838

TWERSKI,

supra note 56, at 521-22.

(1973).
83. For a discussion of risk-utility analysis, see supra note 11.
84. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 74, § 28.5, at 1543; Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence of Design or Directions For Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 836-41 (1962);

Twerski, supra note 56, at 569.
85. A manufacturer must design the product to be safe for intended as well as reasonably foreseeable unintended uses. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 385-86, 348 N.E.2d at
577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121. If the product is used in a manner clearly not foreseeable to the
manufacturer and injury results, however, a court may not allow the case to proceed to the
jury since the plaintiff's abnormal use of the product, rather than the product's design, was the
proximate cause of the harm. Noel, supra note 84, at 856-62. See infra note 110.

86. For an exhaustive list of cases adopting risk-utility in design defect cases, see Twerski, supra note 56, at 522 n.l. See also Neider v. Chrysler Corp., 361 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affid 491 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1974), which presented a fact situation similar to that in

Schemel. Plaintiffs claimed that the automobile manufactured by defendant was not safe at
the 120 mile per hour speed it was capable of attaining. While the district court opinion did
not discuss the speed issue, but instead focused on evidentiary questions, the significance of the
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There are problems, however, attendant to the use of risk-utility
analysis in design defect litigation. In Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.,87
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a jury verdict
that an automobile manufactured by defendant was not reasonably
fit to withstand a collision. In its conclusion, however, the court expressed discomfort with the unhindered practice of submitting design
defect claims to the jury, because of the lack of uniformity or consistency which would result. 88 While the jury in Dawson found
Chrysler liable for not producing a rigid enough vehicular frame,
another jury in another case might find a manufacturer liable for
producing a frame that was too rigid.89 The result would be to allow
individual juries to establish national automobile safety standards
and to impose conflicting requirements on automobile manufacturers.9 0
In Slatkavitz v. General Motors Corp.,91 the District Court of
Massachusetts indicated that risk-utility analysis would yield inconsistent verdicts as applied to cases challenging automobile speed capabilities. Slatkavitz involved a negligence claim against GM for designing and manufacturing a vehicle capable of attaining excessive
and unlawful speeds. The court recognized defendant's duty to design a product fit for intended and foreseeably unintended uses, 92 but
indicated that the issue of automobile speed capacity eluded riskutility analysis: "Speed and acceleration are relative terms, always
operating in changing contexts, and it divorces social policy from
practical reality to measure a manufacturer's reasonableness by
speed capacity alone." 9

III.

JUDICIAL SCREENING OF SPEED CASES: MULTI-FACTOR DUTY
ANALYSIS

The growth of products liability law has resulted in the increased use of risk-utility analysis in determining whether a design is
case lies in the submission to the jury of the question of defendant's negligence in designing a
car capable of excessive speeds.

This Note does not advocate the submission of all speed cases to the jury. It does, however, recommend jury consideration of the issue after a multi-factor judicial screening process.
See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
87. 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
88. Id. at 962-63.
89. Id. at 962.
90. Id.
91.

523 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mass. 1981).

92. Id. at 385.
93. Id.
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defective.9 4 The problems identified in Dawson and Slatkavitz, however, indicate that the unhindered use of risk-utility analysis in every
case may yield unwarranted plaintiff's verdicts.95
In response to this problem, several commentators have proposed the use of a judicial screening process by which judges could
selectively determine, as a matter of law, whether or not a design
defect issue should proceed to the jury.98 Rather than utilizing one
94. See supra note 6.
95. See also Kelley v. R.G. Indus. Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985) (suggesting
that the risk-utility analysis is only applicable when something "goes wrong" with a product;
in cases where the product functioned exactly as intended, i.e. the firing of a handgun which
caused injury to another person, a different standard must be used).
96. Professor Wade advocates the consideration and weighing of seven factors in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, or not duly safe:
1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility.
5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition
of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 82, at 837-38.
Professor Twerski criticizes the Wade factors as overly simplistic, and advocates the use
of an alternative, ten-factor test to determine whether or not the defendant owed a duty to
plaintiff:
1) Polycentricity: Aspects of the product design may be related in such a way that
any design change would substantially affect the cost, utility, safety, or esthetics
of the product.
2) Close risk-utility proof: The task of weighing and balancing the product's potential for harm against its utility may be difficult or impossible.
3) State of the art: The alternative design may not be practically feasible in light of
the state of the art.
4) Tenuous causation: The case for causation-in-fact may be tenuous.
5) Shifting duty: Independent and responsible decisionmakers may have played a
significant role in assessing and utilizing the allegedly hazardous product.
6) Consumer choice: Consumers may have the option to purchase a similar product without the allged safety hazard.
7) Obviousness of danger: The hazard may be open and obvious to the ordinary
consumer.
8) Cost: An alternative design could substantially raise the cost of the product to
the consumer.
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single factor in determining whether or not a duty is owed, the decision to allow the issue of defendant's reasonableness to proceed to
the jury would result from consideration of a number of relevant factors. Such a multi-factor duty analysis would enable a court to balance important policy questions with the issues presented by a particular defect claim.
The process may lead the court to the conclusion that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. In such a case, the court would
direct a verdict for the defendant. Alternatively, the court might
conclude that the defendant did in fact owe a duty to the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the issue of defect would then proceed to the jury for a
risk-utility analysis. In either event, the court will have screened
those cases likely to yield unwarranted results.
The analysis of the speed cases should include examination of at
97
least the four following factors:
1) The obviousness of the harm likely to result from gross
speeding;
2) The ability of the consumer to choose an automobile capable of
achieving slower speeds;
3) Whether society has shifted the duty of the automobile manufacturer to the consumer; and
4) Whether the design of an automobile is so multifaceted as to
make judicial analysis impossible.
While one individual factor may strongly suggest that a verdict be
directed for the manufacturer, or that the case proceed to the jury
for a risk-utility analysis, the ultimate decision results from a consideration and balancing of all the relevant factors.
9) Design safety review process: The safety review process that led to the formulation of the product's design may have been extensive.
10) Legislation: The government may have played a role in regulating the product's
design.
Twerski, supra note 56, at 526-27. See also Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of
Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974) (advancing a two-part test composed of 13 individual
factors); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort
Liabilityfor Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 818 (1976) (suggesting a four-part analysis to determine product defect); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109,
1370-71 (1974) (suggesting 13 factors relevant to establishing product defect).
97. The speeding case does not necessarily implicate all of the factors in any one multi-

factor scheme. Accordingly, the four factors selected are those common to several of the
schemes listed and those most relevant to the analysis of the automobile manufacturer's duty
to persons injured as a result of gross speeding.
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A.

Obviousness of the Danger of Speeding

While the patent danger rule is no longer a workable singlefactor no-duty rule, 98 the obviousness to the automobile driver of the
risks of gross speeding is relevant in a determination of the manufacturer's duty.
It may be obvious to the average driver, as a matter of common
sense, that gross speeding is dangerous.9 9 The importance of driving
within the 55 mile per hour speed limit has also been underscored by
various media campaigns. 10 0 If the danger of gross speeding is obvious to the driver, the result may be a decrease in the probability of
accidents occurring because of this misuse of the automobile. Several
commentators suggest that the reduced probability of harm, when
balanced with other relevant factors, may lead to the conclusion that
the product was not defective.10 1 If the automobile was honestly
marketed, and its dangers were open and obvious, the only method
of preventing the dangerous use of the automobile would be a form
of paternal supervision which is not within the court's role to
10 2
provide.
One problem presented by the speed cases is the effect of automobile advertisements which not only fail to warn consumers of the
dangers of speeding, but actually assure drivers that their cars are
98. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
99. LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1980).
100. For example, the State of California in 1985 formed a task force to increase awareness of the 55 mile per hour speed limit. From June to August of that year, the State used a
$50,000 federal grant to fund a public awareness campaign which included a television commercial and signs on billboards. Featured in the campaign was a picture of a personal check
accompanied by the slogan "55-Can you afford not to?". Telephone interview with Mark
Lunn, Sargeant in charge of Public Affairs for the Los Angeles County Highway Patrol (Aug.

11, 1986).
The State of New Jersey has concentrated its efforts in the area of enforcement rather
than awareness. Although media campaigns have been used in the past, which included such
slogans as "55 Saves Lives" and "55-A Law We Can Live With," the State has elected to
use a $509,000 federal grant to expand its patrol force in an effort to curtail speeding. Telephone interview with William Taylor, Manager of the New Jersey Office of Highway Safety
(Aug. 11, 1986).
101. Fischer, supranote 96, at 359 (listing consumer's knowledge of a risk and ability to
control the danger as two of 13 factors); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 96, at 818 (the
ability of the consumer to recognize the risks of the condition of the product as one of four
relevant factors); Twerski, supra note 56, at 567-73 (obviousness of the danger is one of 10
relevant factors); Wade, supra note 82, at 837 (listing as one of seven factors, the user's
awareness "of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product").
102. Twerski, supra note 56, at 573.
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comfortable at 110 miles per hour.103 While information highlighting
the obviousness of the danger of speeding may reduce the probability
of harm, the effect may be cancelled out by contemporaneous information luring the consumer to the very feature which makes the automobile dangerous. Advertisements casting the speed capabilities of
the automobile in a favorable light may actually increase, rather
than decrease, the probability of harm. If so, the court may be more
likely to find that the manufacturer owes a duty to the plaintiff to
anticipate and guard against the danger of gross speeding.
B.

Consumer Choice

The ability of the consumer to choose from a broad range of
products varying in price and quality may influence the court's willingness to find that a manufacturer owed a duty to an injured plaintiff.1°4 Since safety is one element of a product's design which would
affect the price of the product, a consumer's conscious decision to
pay less and receive less product safety, when considered along with
the other factors, may suggest that the consumer, rather than the
manufacturer, has the duty to avoid or minimize the harm caused by
10 5
that product.
Consumers have little choice with regard to the speed capabilities of automobiles. In what may be perceived as an effort to curtail
speeding, speedometers have been modified in some automobiles to
indicate maximum speeds of 85, rather than 120 miles per hour.108
103. See supra note 12.
104. For a multi-factor analysis which includes consumer choice, see Twerski, supra
note 56, at 566-67; Wade, supra note 82, at 837 ("the availability of a substitute product

which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe" listed as a factor).
105. Twerski, supra note 56, at 566-67.
106. A spokesman for the Ford Motor Company's Office of General Counsel indicated
that the oil crisis of the mid-1970's prompted a proposal in Congress to require automobile
manufacturers to equip cars with 85 mile per hour maximum speedometers. Technical
problems prohibited this practice, however, since a speedometer will not be accurate unless the
design is symmetrical around a desired point. If this desired point is 55 miles per hour, the
easiest, and technically most reliable speedometer has a maximum of 110 miles per hour.
The spokesman stated that many Ford models do have 85 mile per hour maximum speedometers, a change that was prompted by a Ford management decision. The indicator needles
on these speedometers, however, do go beyond 85 miles per hour if the cars are driven in
excess of this speed. This is done so that the driver will have a visual indication of how fast he
is actually traveling.
Certain newer Ford automobiles are equipped with digital speedometers. These are not
limited to 85 mile per hour gauges since the inability to register speeds above 85 miles per
hour would mean that the driver would have no visual indication of any kind on the digital
readout if he did exceed 85 mile per hour.
The Ford spokesman concluded that the 85 mile per hour speedometers were not accom-
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Nonetheless, the consumer still has no choice but to purchase a car
panied by any adjustment in automobile speed capabilities, and merely affected a change in
the speedometer's display. Telephone interview with spokesman for Ford Motor Company, Office of General Counsel, Detroit, Mich. (Aug. 12, 1986).
In contrast, a spokesman for AC Sparkplug, a division of General Motors, stated that the
85 mile per hour speedometers were mandated by federal law. He stated that approximately
90% of all new General Motors vehicles are equipped with these speedometers, and the remaining percentage of automobiles are high performance models, such as the TransAm and
the Corvette, for which exceptions have been granted. Telephone interview with spokesman for
AC Sparkplug, Division of General Motors, Detroit, Mich. (Aug. 12, 1986).
In fact, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (the agency) had created a
safety standard, effective September 1, 1979, which required automobile manufacturers to
highlight the numeral "55", and to indicate a maximum speed of 85 miles per hour on all
speedometers. 49 C.F.R. § 571.127 (1979) (rescinded). The agency believed that this standard
would reduce "the temptation for immature drivers to test the upper speeds of their vehicles on
public roads." 46 Fed. Reg. 51,788 (1981). In addition, the highlighted "55" on the speedometer was intended to "help drivers maintain the lower speeds mandated by the nationwide 55
mile per hour speed limit." Id.
In February and March of 1981, however, the agency reviewed the standard and determined that it would not yield significant safety benefits, and would place unnecessary financial
burdens on automobile manufacturers. The agency stated that the standard was unnecessary
since, prior to the effective date of the standard, several automobile manufacturers had voluntarily lowered the maximum speed indication on their speedometers to 85 or 100 miles per
hour because of "liability concerns." Id. at 51,799.
Furthermore, the agency stated that automobile manufacturers' decreasing emphasis on
high performance cars made it unlikely that manufacturers would raise the maximum speed
indication if the federal standard was revoked. Id. Finally, there was no firm evidence to suggest that the highlighted "55" was having any positive effect on speed reduction. The agency
conceded that "many drivers frequently drive 5 to 10 miles per hour above any posted highway
speed limit, including the 55 mile per hour speed limit," and concluded that "[a] highlighted
'55' on a speedometer scale adds little to the information provided to the driver by a roadside
speed limit sign." Id.
Accordingly, the standard was revoked on February 18, 1982, effective March 25, 1982.
47 Fed. Reg. 7250 (1982). In revoking the standard, the agency encouraged experimentation
by manufacturers to improve automobile safety, subject to review by the agency. Id. It also
stated that all automobile manufacturers which had commented on the proposal to rescind the
standard
indicated that they would voluntarily continue to provide some of the features formerly required by the standard. American Motors, Chrysler, Ford, General Motors,
Mack, Renault, Subaru, and Volvo White Truck Corporation said they would maintain a maximum scale of 85 miles per hour or less. Honda said it would modify its
speedometers to show the maximum capabilities of its vehicles. . . .American Motors, Ford, Mack, Renault, Subaru, and Volvo White said they would also continue
to highlight the '55' miles per hour position on the speedometer scales. Honda said
it would drop the highlighting.
Id. at 7251.
The agency concluded by recommending an early effective date for revocation of the standard since "it will avoid the unnecessary expenditure by manufacturers on requirements that
have no significant safety benefits." Id. at 7253.
Consequently, any changes in speedometer indicators to reflect lower maximum speeds are
the result of manufacturer discretion.
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capable of speeds far in excess of the 55 mile per hour legal limit.
This lack of choice in the market might increase the court's willing-

ness to determine that the automobile manufacturer owes a duty to
plaintiff with respect to harm caused by excessive speed.
The difficulty with imposing liability on the manufacturer, however, is that society has expressed its enthusiastic approval of high
speed automobiles.107 Advertisements emphasizing speed and power
are presumably targeted at a receptive audience of drivers who frequently exceed the speed limit. 10 8 Accordingly, courts may be unwilling to deter automobile manufacturers from designing high speed
automobiles with which society finds favor.
107. See MacDonald, supra note 46, at 27, col. 5 ("New cars are safer not only because
they're in better condition but also because they're designed for the higher speeds drivers
plainly prefer.").
108. Of 4,895,000 vehicles clocked in 1982, the average speed traveled was 59 miles per
hour. Seventy-three percent of the automobiles exceeded 55 miles per hour, 40% exceeded 60
miles per hour, and 14% exceeded 65 miles per hour. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1985, at 601 (105th ed. 1984) (No. 1046 Motor Vehicle Travel,
By Type of Vehicle & Speed: 1970 to 1982). See supra note 46.
Current information illustrates substantial disregard of the 55 mile per hour limit. Despite
an awareness campaign in California in 1985, a spokesman indicated that the number of instances of speeding has not been reduced. See supra note 100.
Similarly, a New Jersey official stated that 39-40% of those who drive in New Jersey
exceed the speed limit. Approximately 300,000 summonses are issued each year in that state
for speeding. Id.
While studies indicate that the 55 mile per hour limit has saved between 2,000 and 4,000
lives each year, and that 70% of Americans are in favor of retaining the 55 mile per hour
limit, a growing faction has expressed interest in abolishing the national 55 mile per hour
speed limit. Darlin, Does 55 MPH Speed Limit Save Lives? More Drivers Are Doubtful, Wall
St. J., Apr. 28, 1986, § 2, at 27, col. 6.
Support for the law is lowest in the western states and highest among those who drive the
least. Martz, Does Speed Kill?, Newsweek, July 21, 1986, at 14. Enforcement of the 55 mile
per hour limit is necessarily selective, and penalties vary widely. Some states impose fines of up
to $100 for driving at 65 miles per hour with a penalty toward loss of license and notification
to insurers. Other states, particularly those with flat terrain and wide open spaces, fine drivers
as little as five dollars for an offense referred to as "wasting motor fuel." Id.
Opponents of the 55 mile per hour limit maintain that there is no correlation between the
speed limit and the declining national highway death rate. Instead, they attribute the reduced
death rate to seat belt and child restraint laws, campaigns against drunk driving, improved
automobile and highway design, and advanced medical technology. Id. at 15.
All of the states "complain that trying to enforce the speed law hampers their efforts to
deal with more pressing problems, such as drunken driving." Id. at 17. However, they are
compelled to devote resources to enforcement of the speed law in order to secure federal funding. See supra note 2. Despite recent efforts by some states to challenge the law, the Administration has demonstrated reluctance to reconsider this controversial issue. For a complete discussion of the pros and cons surrounding the 55 mile per hour limit, see Martz, supra this
note.
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C. Shifting Duty
Several commentators suggest that courts should consider
whether the user, and not the manufacturer, should have the responsibility of avoiding the particular harm. 10 9 This position may also be
expressed in terms of proximate cause:110 since the driver of an automobile knows the particular uses to which he puts the vehicle and

can control those uses, his misuse (speeding), not the capability of
the automobile to achieve excessive speeds, is the proximate cause of

any harm.
If this argument suggests that an automobile user who drives at
120 miles per hour is an intervening/superseding cause,1 1 ' thereby

eliminating any liability on the part of the manufacturer, it is legally
unsound. Conduct of the user cannot break the line of causation if

such conduct was foreseeable to the manufacturer. 1 Speeding is not
only foreseeable to the automobile manufacturer' 1 3 but, arguably, is
1
also encouraged by the manufacturer via advertisements.

14

A preferable interpretation of the argument, and one which
courts should consider, is that society may have shifted the duty to
109. Fischer, supra note 96, at 359 (the ability of the consumer to "minimize the risk
through careful use of the product"); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 96, at 818 ("the
respective abilities of the manufacturer and the consumer to (a) recognize the risks of the
condition, (b) reduce such risks, and (c) absorb or insure against such risks-the allocation of
risk awareness and control between the manufacturer and the consumer"); Wade, supra note
82, at 837 ("the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.").
110. Proximate cause, referred to as "legal cause" in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 431 (1965), is a concept used in "setting the limits beyond which the courts will not look in
the attempt to trace the connection between a given cause and a given effect." Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Daniels, 8 Ga. App. 775, 778, 70 S.E. 203, 205 (1911). If the causal link
between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury is too attenuated, the court will not grant
relief to the plaintiff. While the concept is not easily defined, it has been the subject of numerous articles. See generally L. GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS

(1963); Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an

Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1920); Campbell, Duty, Fault and Legal Cause, 1938 Wisc. L.
REV. 402; Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE L.J. 449
(1930). For an exhaustive list of articles discussing proximate, or legal cause, see W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41, at 263, n.l. (5th ed. 1984).
111. An intervening/superceding cause is an act which takes place after the negligent
act of defendant, and is a separate factor said to cause the harm to plaintiff. See generally W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 110, § 44 at 301-19.
112. For a recent and dramatic illustration of this doctrine, see Kelley v. R.G. Indus.,
Inc., 304 Md. 124, 156, 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (1985) (holding that criminal use of a "Saturday Night Special" handgun is clearly foreseeable to the manufacturer who, therefore, is liable
to the victim of criminal use of the gun).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
114. Id. See also supra note 12.
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avoid or minimize the danger of speeding from the manufacturer to
the user.1 15 Since the driver is more familiar with his own driving
habits and with driving conditions at any given time, he has the responsibility to exercise discretion with regard to the car's speed. The
possibility of a shifting duty must be examined, along with the other
factors, in order to determine the manufacturer's duty to those injured in speed-related accidents.
D. Polycentricity
Commentators have suggested that certain design defect cases

are polycentric 16 because they present multi-faceted problems in
which each point for decision is related to all the others in such a
way that consideration of one issue without consideration of all the
others is impossible.117 Professor Henderson explains the polycentricity problem with reference to a spider web. "If one strand [of the
web] is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur
throughout the entire web. If another strand is pulled, the relationships among all the strands will again be readjusted."'' n
In the usual design defect case, the plaintiff must propose a
safer alternative to the design of the product which allegedly injured
him. " " With a polycentered problem, however, alternative designs
115. See Twerski, supra note 56, at 564-66. The classic situation where the shiftingduty analysis has been indicated involves the sale of industrial machinery to an industrial user
who fails to install safety equipment. The argument is that the industrial user had full knowledge of the dangerous characteristics of the machine, and therefore he should have the responsibility for installing the safety equipment, and not the manufacturer of the machine. Id. at
565.
116. See Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Twerski, supra note 56, at 527.
117. Professor Henderson states that litigation is a useful process only when an impartial tribunal can determine the relevant facts and apply established rules to reach well-reasoned results. The parties must be able to base their arguments on rules which are specific. In
this manner the parties may argue rationally that a proper application of these rules dictates a
particular outcome. See Henderson, supra note 116, at 1535.
It follows that only those problems which lend themselves to adversarial proofs and arguments logically related to one another are suitable for adjudication. Id. On the other hand, if
the issues cannot be separated and examined individually, the problem is polycentered and
should be resolved by a managerial, instead of a judicial, process. Unlike courts, managerial
bodies are not bound to apply a particular law, and have unhindered discretion in reaching
their decisions. Id. at 1538. They are therefore better equipped to handle polycentered
problems, since they are able to impose their own judgments upon the particular circumstances
of each case.
118. Id. at 1536.
119. See Twerski, supra note 56, at 553-54 (plaintiff will necessarily propose an alternative design which would have avoided the particular harm he suffered; defendant must then
argue that overall considerations justify his design choice).
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are impossible. Any suggested change in the design which would
have avoided the particular harm suffered by plaintiff will necessitate other alterations which may cause more severe harm to other
product users.
Because of the interrelation of the factors which combine to
form a particular product design, any change in the design may require managerial, rather than judicial, decisionmaking. In such
cases, it is argued that the court should defer to an alternative managerial decisionmaking body. 20
Self v. General Motors Corp.,1121 provides a meaningful illustration of polycentricity. In that case, plaintiff's car was stopped on the
shoulder of a freeway. A car traveling at speeds of 65-85 miles per
hour crashed into the left rear of the plaintiffs car. Upon impact,
the fuel tank, located by the left rear fender of plaintiff's car, ruptured and the car caught fire. The plaintiff claimed that the car was
defective with regard to the location of the fuel tank. 2
The court noted its frustration in evaluating the design of a
complex product, since the parties had such divergent orientations.
The plaintiff argued that this particular accident could have been
minimized had the defendants placed the fuel tank in a different location in the vehicle. 23 The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the damage suffered by the plaintiffs vehicle was so extensive that the location of the fuel tank did not bring about
plaintiff's injuries. Regardless of the location of the tank, they argued that plaintiff's vehicle would have exploded as a result of the
high-speed impact. 24 Defendants also indicated that the car which
hit plaintiffs car was equipped with a fuel tank located in the position plaintiffs advocated as a safe alternative, yet it also ruptured
and caught fire in the collision. 25 The court noted that the courtroom was a poor arena for the redesign of an automobile, since the
suit would invariably emphasize one single aspect of the design while
ignoring all other relevant aspects. 26
Despite the dissent's urging that the jury not be asked to grapple with the difficulties inherent in designing a complicated prod120.
121.

Henderson, supra note 116, at 1538.
42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).

122.

Id. at 5, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 577.

123.

Id. at 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 578.

124. Id. at 9, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 7-8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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uct, 1 27 the majority supported the trial court's decision to allow the
issue of the defendant's reasonableness in locating the fuel tank in
the left rear of the automobile to go to the jury.
A criticism of the Self court's decision to allow the case to proceed to the jury centers not on the jury's inability to understand
complex design information, but on the many factors involved in the
design which make it impossible to examine in any logical sequence.
If each proposed alteration in design affects another aspect which, in
turn, has an impact on yet another aspect of the design, the jury,
and possibly the court, cannot address the particular problem in anything but an arbitrary fashion. 2 8
As in the Self decision, courts in speed cases are not deciding
whether the product conformed to the manufacturer's own established standards.' 29 Rather, they are determining whether the design
30
of the entire product line was reasonable.1
The determination of whether the speed capabilities of automobiles should be limited requires the use of some standard for evaluation.13 1 The problem, however, is that no such standard exists. Moreover, the question of how fast an automobile should be equipped to
travel raises many interrelated issues. For example:
1) Speed is a relative concept. What is considered speeding on an
urban street may be perfectly reasonable on an open road in a
rural area. Furthermore, a speed which is reasonable on a clear
day when driving conditions are optimal may be dangerously
127.
128.

Id. at 15, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85 (Compton, A.J., concurring and dissenting).
Twerski, supra note 56, at 552-53.

129.

When courts measure the allegedly defective product against a standard preestab-

lished by the manufacturer, the flaw in the product is referred to as a manufacturing or pro-

duction defect. See supra note 6.
130. For a discussion of design defects, see supra note 6.
131. Professor Henderson states that standard setting is implicit in the courts' attempted
application of a general reasonableness standard in "a design defect case. Henderson, supra
note 116, at 1533:
Passing judgment upon the acceptability or reasonableness of any product . . . implies a relatively particularized normative standard against which the product ...
may be measured. If the courts are to render such judgments, they must either
accept and apply particularized standards developed elsewhere or develop standards
by themselves.
Id. Henderson further states that while courts are well-suited to the task of applying existing
product standards, they cannot and should not establish such standards in the course of applying a reasonableness standard. Id. at 1534. For further discussion on the need for standards,
see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 74, at 880-83; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 206-07
(4th ed. 1971).
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13 2
fast at night, or during inclement weather.
2) The speed of the automobile bears some relation to fuel economy. A design change with respect to the automobile's maxiumu speed would require technological changes, and may also
have an impact on fuel consumption.
3) A judicial decision that an automobile manufacturer is liable
for designing a car capable of excess speeds would dictate a
change in design in the entire industry. Manufacturers, fearful
of liability, would alter the speed capabilities of their automobiles, and those manufacturers who market their automobiles
with an emphasis on speed capabilities may lose their competitive position in the marketplace.
4) Society approves of high speed automobiles.' 33 A speed-related
design change would affect the appeal of the automobile, and
may influence buying patterns.

A court, rather than rendering a case nonjusticiable, should
consider the polycentricity problem in connection with the other factors relevant to the speed cases. 34 The complexity of the polycentric
issues may explain the near absence of litigation of speed cases, and
may indicate that the problem is better suited to legislative
135
analysis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The analysis undertaken in this Note demonstrates the difficulties involved in determining the automobile manufacturer's responsi132. See Slatkavitz v. General Motors Corp., 523 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mass. 1981);
supra text accompanying note 93.
133. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
134. Twerski, supra note 56, at 553, stating:
Courts should assess the "polycentricity quotient" based on the facts of each case. A
court may, at one extreme, disregard polycentricity and, at the other, direct a verdict for defendant because of it. In the more commonly encountered middle range, a
court should accord polycentricity whatever weight it believes the factor deserves in
considering it together with the other duty factors.
135. Deferral to the legislature will not be effective, however, if the legislature takes no
action. Since the adoption in 1975 of the 55 mile per hour national speed limit, see supra note
2, the Secretary of Transportation has not promulgated any regulation of automobile speed
capabilities. This has resulted in insulation from liability for automobile manufacturers who
continue to design and advertise automobiles capable of excessive speeds. See supra text accompanying note 12.
Professor Henderson urges that when a court responds to polycentered problems it impugns the integrity of the adjudicative process. Henderson, supra note 116, at 1539. If the
court finds, however, that the problems will not be satisfactorily addressed by an alternative
decision-making body such as the legislature, it may be more inclined to decide a polycentered
problem. See Twerski, supra note 56, at 551.
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bility to a party injured in an accident caused by excessive speeding.
Courts have deferred to the legislature on the problem. While the 55
mile per hour speed limit remains in effect, automobile manufacturers are not restricted with regard to the speed capabilities of their
products.
The increase in advertisements emphasizing automobile speed
and power is likely to lead to cases presenting fact situations similar
to Schemel. When such cases do arise, courts must take an active
role. While the ultimate decision may follow Schemel and-free the
manufacturer of any threat of liability, the method used in reaching
the decision is as important as the result. Unlike mechanical application of single-factor tests, the multi-factor approach suggested in this
Note may provide courts with the framework necessary to reach decisions likely to have far-reaching effects in the automobile industry.
Gina M. DeDominicis
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